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ABSTRACT 
Let a be a q-rule, where any coalition of size q, from the 
society of size n, is decisive. Let w (a) = 2q - n + 1 and let W be a 
smooth "policy apace" of dimension w. Let U (W)N be the apace of all 
smooth profiles on W, endowed with the Whitney topology. It is shown 
that there exists an "instability dimension" w• (a) with 
2 ! w•(a) � w(a) such that: 
(i) if w l w•(a) then the core of a is empty for a dense set of 
profiles in U (W) N (i.e., almost always)
(ii) if w l w (a) + 1 then the cycle set is dense in W, almost 
always 
(iii) if w > w (a) + 1 then the cycle set is also path connected, 
almost always. 
The method of proof is first of all to show that if a point 
belongs to the core then certain generalized symmetry conditions in 
terms of "pivotal" coalitions of size 2q - n must be satisfied. 
Secondly, if the dimension is w(a) then it is shown that these 
symmetry conditions can almost never be satisfied. 
STRUCTURAL INSTABILITY OF THE CORE 
R. D. McKelvey and N. Schofield 
1. INTRODUCTION 
It is now generally well-known that if the set of 
alternatives, W, can be represented by a subset of Euclidean space, 
and individual preferences are smooth, then the direction gradients at 
a point in the majority rule core must satisfy strong symmetry 
properties (Plott, 1967). Indeed, if the dimension of W is at least 
two, and if these properties are satisfied at a point then an 
arbitrary small perturbation of these preferences (in the c1-topology) 
is sufficient to destroy the required symmetry, On the other hand when 
the majority rule core is empty then it will generally be the case 
that voting trajectories can be constructed throughout the space 
(McKelvey, 1976, 1979), 
Another way of expressing these results is that majority rule, 
am, in the spatial context, is classified by an integer w•(am), which 
is two in the case when the society is of odd size and three if the 
society is of even size. Let U (W)N be the set of smooth profiles for 
the society, N, on W, endowed with the Whitney topology, and let 
GO(am,W,N,u) be the core, or set of unbeaten points in W under the 
majority rule preference relation am(u), Previous results (due to 
Matthews, 1980; and Schofield, 1983a) have shown essentially that if 
the dimension of W, or dim (W), is at least w•(am) then GO(am,W,N,u) is 
empty, for any profile u in a dense set in U(W)N, Moreover, if 
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dim(W) } w•(am) + 1 then again, for a dense set of profiles in U(W)
N, 
voting cycles can fill up a dense set in W (see Cohen, 1979; Cohen and 
Matthews, 1980; Matthews, 1982; Schofield, 1983a), 
In an earlier paper (Schofield, 1980) it was shown that this 
theorem was valid for an arbitrary voting rule a (without vetoers) 
where the instability dimension, w•(a) of a, was bounded above by 
(n - 1), with n being the size of the society. 
In this paper we obtain the same theorem for a social choice 
mechanism, a, (without vetoers) whose set of decisive coalitions 
contains all coalitions with at least q different members. For such a 
"q-rule" we obtain a generalized symmetry requirement that must be 
satisfied at any point in the core (Theorem 3). We use this result to 
show that the instability dimension, w• (a), for a q rule is no greater 
than w (a) : 2q - n + 1 (Theorem l), Since majority rule am can be 
regarded as a q-rule with (n,q) : (2k - 1,k) or (2k,k + 1) depending 
on whether n is odd or even, this allows us to infer that for majority 
rule, 
2k - (2k - 1) + 1 2 
or 
depending on whether n is odd or even. Thus Theorem 1 generalizes the 
previous results on majority rule. Moreover, Theorem 3 gives an 
indication how the inst�bility dimension can be computed for any 
social choice mechanism without vetoers. 
We also examine the cycle set, which we label IC(a, W, N, u) or 
IC. We show that IC, for a q-rule, is almost always open dense in 
dimension at least w(a) + 1, and in dimension at least w(a) + 2 is 
also path connected. The significance of path connectedness is that, 
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with this property, local agenda manipulation can lead from almost any 
point in W to almost any other point (McKelvey, 1979). This implies 
that in dimension w(a) + 2, a q-rule must almost always fail 
implementability and 11Maskin" monotonicity (see also Haskin, 1977; 
Haskin, 1979; Dasgupta, Hammond and Haskin, 1979; Ferejohn, Grether 
and McKelvey, 1982; Moulin, 1983; Schofield, 1984a). 
2. SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 
In this section we briefly review the social choice 
definitions that we use. 
(i) A binary relation p on W is a subset of W X W. We adopt the 
notation xpy iff (x, y) s p. A strict preference relation p 
on W is a binary relation which is irreflexive (i. e. , 
�x e W s. t. xpx) and asymmetric (xpy � not(ypx) wherever 
x, y e W). We read 11xpy11 as 11x is preferred to y. 11 
Let B(W) be the set of strict preference relations 
on W, and define B(W)N = B(W) X • • • X B(W), n times, to be 
the set of strict preference profiles for the society N, of 
size n, on W. That is if p = (p1, • • •  , pn) e B(W)
N then pi 
represents i's preference under p. 
(ii) A strict preference relation p s B(W) is said to be cyclic 
iff there exists a finite subset X = Cx1, • • •  , xr} c W such 
that 
Such a set X is called a p-cycle. If there exists no p-
cycle then p is called acyclic. Write A(W) for the set of 
acyclic strict preference relations. 
(iii) A social preference function (SF) is a function 
a : B(W)N � B(W) which satisfies the independence axiom 
[see Schofield, 1980, def. 2.21. For p s B(W)N, xa(p)y 
reads "x is socially pref erred to y under the social 
preference function a and profile p. 11 
(iv) The core, or global optima set, of a given a profile 
p e B(W)N is defined to be 
GO(a, W, N, p) (xeW �yeW s. t. xa(p)y}, 
(v) The global pareto set of a subset M c N, given the profile 
p e B(W)N, is defined to be 
GO(W, M, p) (x e W: �ye W s. t. xpiy '>r/i e M}. 
(vi) The global cycle set GC(a, W, N, p) of an SF, a, given a 
profile p e B(W)N is defined by x e GC(a, W, N, p) iff there 
exists a finite a(p)-cycle X such that x e X. 
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(vii) Each SF, a, defines a class IDa of subsets of N, called 
a-decisive coalitions, where M s  IDa iff wherever p s B(W)
N 
and xpiy, Vi s M, then xa(p)y. 
(viii) An SF, a, is called a voting rule iff for any x, y s W and 
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p s B(W)N then xa(p)y implies there exists M s  IDa such that 
xpiy for all i s M. A voting rule called a � and 
written aq iff it is the case that M s  IDa whenever 
IMI l q, 
where n/2 < q i n - 1. 
(x) If ID is a class of subsets of N, then the collegium /((ID) 
of ID is defined to be 
/((ID ) n M. 
Ms ID 
(xi) An SF, a, is said to be collegial iff /( ID a> I cl>. If 
/<(ID a) = cl> then a is said to be non-collegial. 
(xii) For any class ID of subsets of N, define the Nakamura number 
v(ID) by 
v(ID) = °' iff /((ID) I <I> 
v(ID) = min fl ID' I ID ' c ID and /( ID ' ) = cl>} 
if K(ID) = <I>. 
For an SF, a, define v(a) = v(ID a> . 
As an example of a q-rule, consider the rule given by 
q = k when n = 2k - 1 
q = k + 1 when n = 2k 
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This rule is called majority rule and written am• 
It is easy to show that except for the case (n, q) = (4,3) the Nakamura 
number for majority rule am is 3. For the q-rule a given by 
(n, q) = (4,3) we obtain v(a) = 4. 
An important question in social choice concerns the existence 
of the core for a(p). It is well known that if W is a finite set then 
GC(a, W, N, p) U GO(a,W, N, p) I cl>. 
Indeed this will also be true if W is a compact topological space and 
preferences are continuous (Walker, 1977). Thus in this case the 
question of existence of a core is ef fectively equivalent to the 
question of non-existence of a-cycles. 
Suppose we let 
GO(W, ID , p) n GO(W, M, p)
Ms ID 
when ID is a family of coalitions. Then clearly, for any SF, 
GO(a, W, N, p) c: GO(W, ID a•P) 
with equality if a is a voting rule. If p s A(W)N then GO(W, M, p) F cf> 
for each M s  N. Thus if /((ID a) I cl> and a is a voting rule, then the 
core will be non-empty. On the other hand if /((ID a) = cl> and W is a 
finite set of cardinality lwl l v(a) then a result of Nakamura (1978) 
shows that there exists p s A(W)N such that GO(a, W, N, p) = cl> and so 
GC(a, W, N, p) I cf>. If lwl i v(a) then for every p s A(W)N it is the 
case that GC(a, W, N, p) =<I> and so GO(a, W, N, p) F cl>. 
It can be shown that there is a parallel result in the case 
that w is admissible (i.e. , a compact convex subset of Euclidean 
space), Let C (W)N be the set of all preference profiles on W such 
that each individual preference is convex. Then results by Greenberg 
(1979), Schofield (1984a) and Strnad (1984) show that GO(a, W, N, p) F if> 
for all p s C (W)N iff dim (W) { v (a) - 2. As a consequence the 
existence of a core cannot be guaranteed when dim(W) } v(a) - 1. 
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In other words if dim (W) l v (a) - 1 then it is always possible 
to find a profile p s C (W)N such that GO(a, W, N, p) is empty. The 
result proved in this paper is that if dim(W) l w• (a) then GO(a,W, N, p) 
is empty for "almost every" smooth profile P• Of course this means 
that w• (a) > v• (a), where v•(a) = v(a) - 2 is the stability dimension 
for a. For example, if aq is a q-rule then v• (aq) is the greatest 
integer which is strictly less than q/n - q (Greenberg, 1979; 
Schofield, 1983b). It is easy to show that 2q - n + 1 > v•(aq). 
3. SINGULARITY THEORY 
In this paper we shall be concerned with the existence of a 
core when preferences can be represented by smooth utility functions. 
In this case the class of preferences has a topology and we enquire 
whether the subset of profiles which has a non-empty core can have 
non-empty interior. 
We restrict attention to the case when W is a smooth manifold 
of dimension w = dim (W). Assume that for each i s N, there is a 
smooth (Cm) utility function 
which represents i's preference pi' That is to say ui (x) > ui (y) iff 
for any x, y s W. We write u = (u1, .  . .  , un) : W -7 :m
n for a xpiy, 
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smooth profile for N, and write U (W)N for the set of all smooth 
profiles when this set is endowed with the Whitney Cm-topology 
(Golubitsky and Guellemin, 1973, and Hirsch, 1976). A subset U of 
U(W)N is residual iff U is the countable intersection of a family of 
open dense subsets of U (W)N, Since U (W)N is a Baire space, a residual 
subset u of U (W)N is dense in U (W)N: indeed if W is compact then U 
will be open dense. A property 0 of profiles is called generic iff 
8 U (w)N : u satisfies O} contains a residual subset of U (W)N, u0 = {u 
If o is generic we shall also say O is true almost always (abbreviated 
to a. a. ). 
Given the profile u s  U (W)N the differential dui (x) at x of 
the i th component ui is a linear map dui (x) : TxW -7 :m where TxW is
the tangent space at x, and TxW is linearly isomorphic to :m
w. 
respect to a coordinate chart at x, therefore, the Jacobian 
(d ( ) ) be regarded as a linear transformationui x iBN may 
lR w -7 :m n and thus identified, with respect to the 
appropriate basis, with a (wxn) matrix. 
With 
When a is a social preference function we shall write a (u) for 
the preference relation obtained when preference is represented by 
u e U (W)N. In the obvious way write GO (W, M, u) and GO(a, W, N, u) for the 
global pareto set of M and core of a, given u. We may approximate the 
core by the "critical optima set" defined as follows. 
Definition 1 
(i) Let u s U (W)N, and let Ju (x) : TxW � lR 
n be a 
representation of the Jacobian at x. For any coalition 
M c: N let J�(x) : TxW � JR m, where IMI = m, be the obvious 
restricted Jacobian. Let 
Posm = {y s lR
m : Yi> O, \Ii s M}. Then define the 
critical pareto set IO(W,M,u), of M by x s IO (W,M,u) iff 
there exists no v e Txw such that J�(x)(v) s Posm. Define 
the singularity set, /\ (W,M, u), of M by 
x s /\ (W,M,u) iff rank J�(x) < min{m,w}. 
(ii) Let ID be a class of subsets of N. Define 
and 
IO (W,ID,u) 0 IO (W,M,u)
Ms ID 
/\ (W,ID ,u) n /\ (W,M,u) 
Ms ID 
(iii) If a is a social preference function and IDa is the set of 
a-decisive coalitions define the critical optima set and 
singularity set of a (u), respectively by 
IO(a,W,N,u) 
/\ (a,W,N,u) 
It is well known (Smale, 1973) that for any Mc: N, and any u s U (W)N. 
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GO (W,M,u) c: IO(W,M,u). 
Thus when a is a SF, we obtain 
GO(a,W,N,u) c GO (W,IDa,u) c IO(a,W,N,u). 
We write aw for the boundary of W, noting that aw will itself be a 
manifold of dimension dim (W) - 1. We also let Int W = W\aw. It is 
known that if x s Int W then x s IO (W,M,u) iff there exists a 
"semipositive" solution A = (Ai : i s M), with �Ai 1, to the 
equation �Aidui(x) = o . Consequently i f  w l IMI = m and the 
boundary aw of w is empty then 
IO (W,M,u) c: /\ (W,M,u). 
Thus when w l max<IMI : M s ID} and aw = �it is the case that 
GO(a,W,N,u) c: IO (a,W,N,u) c: /\ (W,IDa,u). 
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If we can show that generically it is the case that /\ (W, ID a• u) = � 
then this will show that, when W has no boundary, both IO (a,W,N,u) and 
GO (a,W,N,u) are generically empty. To proceed in this fashion we make 
use of the Thom Singularity Theorem. Consider any coalition M c N, 
where IMI = m. 
Write /\ (W,M,u) 
where 
U /\ s (W,N,u) s)O 
(x s W M rank Ju (x) m - s} 
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Then generically the dimension of /\ s is given by
ds = dim[/\sl = w - s (w - m + s), whenever w l m. In particular 
d1 = m - 1. Moreover, /\ (W,M,u) is a stratified manifold consisting 
generically of an (m - 1) dimensional manifold and lower dimensional 
submanifolds I\ s' for s L 2. We shall write dim[/\ (W,M,u)] for the 
dimension of the highest dimensional component I\ 1 of /\ (W,M,u). As 
Smale has shown, under certain regularity assumptions, IO (W,M,u) will 
also be a stratified manifold with dim[IO (W,M,u)] .{ m - 1. Moreover, 
if M1,M2 are two subsets of N then an argument based on the genericity 
of transversal intersection allows us to obtain a bound on the 
boundary. 
We shall refer to this theorem as ST, 
Suppose that a is a q-rule. Define w (a) 
our main core theorem. 
Theorem 1 
2q - n + 1. We now state 
Let a be a q-rule for a society N and W a smooth manifold. 
Then there exists an integer w•(a) with·2 .{ w•(a) .{ w(a) such that 
(i) (u s U (W)N : Int W n IO (a,W,N,u) = cp} is residual in U (W)N 
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dimension of the intersection of the two singularity sets. This gives whenever dim (W) l w• (a). 
the following theorem (see Schofield, 1980). (ii) (u s U (W)N: IO (a,W,N,u) = cl>} is residual in U (W)N whenever 
Singularity Theorem 
Let W be a smooth manifold of dimension w, and let N be a 
society of size n. Under the stated dimension constraints, the 
following two properties are true, for almost all u s U (W)N. 
(i) dim[/\ (W,M,u)] .{ m - 1 for any Mc N, with IMI = m, whenever 
w 2. m.
(ii) dim[/\ (W,M1,u) n /\ (W,M2,u)] 
.{ max{dim/\ (W,M1,u> +dim /\ (W,M2,u> - w,m12 - 1}, 
where m12 = IM1 n Mzl. whenever w l max{m1,m2l. 
Moreover, the optima set may be substituted for the 
singularity set in statements (i) and (ii) whenever W has empty 
dim (W) l w•(a) + 1. 
Previously (Schofield, 1980) it was shown that this theor em was true 
for an arbitrary non-collegial social preference function a, where the 
"instability dimension" w•(a) was shown to be bounded above by 
w(a) = n - 1 
Suppose we define 
O (a,W) = {u s U (W)N IO (a,W,N,u) i <I>} 
By Theorem 1, for any smooth manifold W without boundary, of dimension 
at least w•(a) it is the case that U (W)N\O (a,W) is residual, and thus 
dense. Suppose that u s  O (a,W). Then any neighborhood U of u in 
U(W)N must intersect W\O(a,W). That is to say, in any neighborhood U 
of u, there exists u' s U such that IO (a,W,N,u') = IP. For this reason 
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we shall say that the optima set is structurally unstable in dimension 
w•(a), 
We also obtain results on the generic existence of a-cycles. 
First of all note that at a point x s W, the differential dui (x) may 
be represented, with respect to a coordinate chart, as a vector 
Vui ( x) s m 
w, called the direction gradient, For convenience we shall 
write Vui (x) as pi(x), and call
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and define 
to be the generalized direction gradient of a (u) at x. 
Define the critical cycle set IC(a,W,N,u) by 
x s IC (a,W,N,u) iff Pa (x) 
= Cl>. 
(iv) Define the local cycle set LC(a,W,N,u) as follows 
x s LC(a,W,N,u) iff for gny neighborhood U of x there exists 
a profile of direction gradients for u at x. a finite a (u)-cycle X with X c U. 
(v) A path connected component W' of W is a subset W' of W such 
Definition 2 that for any two points x,y s W' there exists a continuous 
Let u s U (W)N, where W is a smooth manifold, function C : [0,1] � W' whose image lies in W', such that 
(i) At a point x s W, for coalition Mc N, let 
PM (x) 
= Con( {pi (x) : i s M}) s m 
w 
be the generalized direction gradient for M. (Here Con(A) 
is the convex hull of A in lR w,)
(ii) Let ID be a family of subsets of N. At x s W, define 
where 
PID (x) n � (x) 8 lR 
w 
MsID (x) 
ID (x) = CM e ID : 0 a! PM (x)}. 
(iii) Let a be an SF, with ID its family of decisive coalitions 
C(O) = x and C (l) = y, 
Note that though the profile p (x) of direction gradients at a point 
x s W is dependent on the actual representation chosen, the condition 
PID (x) = Cl? is independent of the representation. Thus IC(a,W,N,u) is 
well defined. From previous results (Schofield, 1978, 1984c) it is 
known that 
IC(a,W,N,u) c LC(a,W,N,u) c clos IC (a,W,N,u) 
where clos (A) means the closure of A in W. It is evident that 
LC(a,W,N,u) c GC (a,W,N,u), Our second theorem states that, under a 
certain dimension constraint, the critical cycle set will be open 
dense and path connected. In this case for almost all pairs of points 
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x,y, say, in W there will exist a path between x and y, within 
IC(a,W,N,u) with the property that the path can be arbitrarily closely 
approximated by a series of coalition manipulations. 
Theorem 2 
Let a be a q-rule on a smooth manifold W and let 
w(a) = 2q - n + 1 as before. Then 
(i) If dim(W) l w(a) + 1 there exists a residual set u1 in U(W)
N 
such that for any u s u1, IC(a,W,N,u) is an open dense set, 
and consists of a finite number of path connected 
components. 
(ii) If dim(W) } w(a) + 2 then there exists a residual set 
u2 c U(W)
N such that for any u s u2, IC(a,W,N,u) is open 
dense �path connected in w. 
The next three sections are devoted to the proof of the two 
theorems. In Section 4 we show that any point, x, in IO(a,W,N,u) may 
be characterized by a certain symmetry conditions on the profile of 
direction gradients p(x). In Section S the singularity theorem is 
generalized to show that the required symmetry conditions will always 
fail for a residual set of profiles, when the dimension of the 
manifold is at least w(a), This gives Theorem 1. Finally in Section 
6, this result is generalized to give Theorem 2. 
4. SYMMETRY CONDITIONS FOR A a-EQUILIBRIUM 
As we have observed if x e Int W n IO(a,W,N,u) then for each 
Ms ID a it is the case that �Aipi(x) = 0 for some 
16 
A = ( .. Ai.. : i e M) s lR 
m with Ai 2 0 \Ji s M, and & Ai = 1. On the
other hand if there exists some vector v e lR w such that pi(x) , v > O 
for all is M, and x s Int W, then x cannot belong to IO(a,W,N,u). In 
this section we examine the symmetry requirements on a "profile" 
p e (lR w)n which are necessary for p = p(x) = (p1(x),, • •  ,pn(x)) to be
the profile of direction gradients at a point x s IO(a,W,N,u). 
Definition 3 
( i) For any vector y e lR w define 
{z e lR w z y > O} 
{ z 8 lR w z y < 0} 
{zs lR w z y=O} 
to be the positive and negative open half spaces, and the 
normal hyperplane, respectively, associated with y, 
(ii) Let p = Cp1, • •  ,,pn) e (lR
w)n be a profile of vectors in lR w, 
for a society N of size n. For each M c N, define 
PM Con({pi i eM}),p;:f Con({-pi i eM)} 
0 H+(pi) c � 
w,H-(pM) ieM 
The half-space H+(pi) is called the i
th preference half 
+ space, and the set H (pM) is called the preference cone of 
coalition M. For any non-zero vector y e  mW let 
be the subset of N which is effective for y, given p. 
(iii) If a is a voting rule, with decisive coalitions ID a• say 
p 8 (mw)n is a q-eguilibrium iff for no y 8 mW does 
Np(y) s ID a' 
(iv) Given a family ID of subsets of N, define two families of 
subsets of N, called E(ID ) and E' (ID ), whose members are 
called pivotal subgroups, as follows: 
(a) M s E(ID ) iff \IL c N\M either M U L e ID or N\L s ID .  
( b )  M s E '  ( ID  ) !ff \I L  c: N\M and any i e N either 
(M U L) \ {i} s ID or (N\L ) \ {i} s ID • 
Note that if p(x) = (p1(x), • • •  ,pn(x)) is a profile of direction 
gradients at a point x s W, then a coalition M is ef fective at x iff 
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pi (x) e H
+(y) for all i s M, and some y e m w. But then pi (x) y ) 0 
+ + or y e  H (pi(x)) Vi e M. Hence H (pM(x)) F cf>, Alternatively 
Mc Np(x)(y) for ye m
w. 
To examine the critical optima set, we deduce those conditions 
on a profile of vectors. such that no decisive coalition is ef fective. 
Theorem 3 
Let a be a voting rule and ID the set of decisive coalitions. 
Let p 
(i) If p is a a-equilibrium and pi F o Vi e N, then for each 
M e E(ID ) there exists jM e N\M such that 
{pi : i e M U  {jM}} is a linearly dependent set. 
(ii) If p is a a-equilibrium and pk = O for exactly one member 
k e N, then, for all Me E' (ID ) there exists jM s N\M\{k} 
such that {pi : i e M U  {jM}} is a linearly dependent set. 
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(i) Pick any Ms E(ID ). If {pi i e M} are linearly dependent 
then for any j e N\M, {pi : i e MU {j}} are linearly 
dependent, and we are finished. Suppose therefore that 
{pi : i s M} are linearly independent, and that for every 
j s N\M, pj t Span({pi : i e M}). Here Span({pi i s M}) 
is the vector subspace of JR w spanned by {pi : i s M}. By 
definition w > IMI = m. Since {pi : i e M} are linearly 
independent, these vectors belong to a hyperplane in JRw of
dimension at most w - 1. That is to say there exists 
x e m w such that 
pi 8 H
0(x) Vi 8 M 
pj t H
0(x) \/j 8 N\M. 
But then 
0 \Ii e M, and x en H (pi). M 
+ + aH (pi), the boundary of H (pi) and so
+ Thus x e aH (pM). In identical fashion x s aH-(pM). For 
j s N\M, pj t H
0(x) so x t Ho(pj) and so either x s H
+(pj) 
or x s H-(pj), Let 
Li = (j s N 
L2 = (j s N 
+ x eH (pj)} 
x s H-(pj}}, 
For each j e N\M, x � Ho(pj) and thus there exists a 
neighborhood Uj(x) of x such that Uj(x) n H
O(pj) = q>, In 
particular 
' and 
Let U(x) = 0 Uj(x).N\M 
+ -Now x e aH (pM) n aH (pM) 
and so U(x) n H+(pM) F q> and U(x) n H
+(pM) F q>,
Choose xi e U(x) n H
+(pM), x2 e U(x) n H
-(pM), 
However, 
and 
i9 
Thus 
and 
Hence 
and Vis MU L2, x2 e H
-(pi} or pi e H
+(-x2), Thus 
Np<xi> =M U Li and Np<-x2> =N U L2• By definition 
{M,Li, L2} is a disjoint partition of N. By assum ption,
M s E(ID ) and so for any Li c N\M either M U Li s ID or 
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N\Li = M U L2 s ID , But both M U Li and M U L2 are 
effective. Thus either MU Li or M U L2 is both effective 
and decisive. Hence the profile p = (pi•••• Pn) cannot be a 
a-equilibrium. Thus if p = (pi•···•Pn) is a a-equilibrium,
then for any M s E(ID ), there exists a jM s N\M such that 
(pi : i s M U  (jM}} is a linearly dependent set. 
(ii) Suppose that pk= o for exactly one k e N. Repeat the proof 
of (i) for N' = N\{k}, to show that for Mc N', there exists 
a partition {M,Li,L2} for N' such that both MU Li and 
M U L2 are effective. 
We now introduce a number of integers that will prove useful in 
Q, E, D. 
2i 
classifying voting rules, and in particular the class of all q- rules. 
Since we assume that n/2 < i < n - i for a q- rule, then we also assume 
that n l 3 and q l 2. 
Definition 4 
For a voting rule, a, let 
e(a) = min(IMI 
e'(a) = minclMI 
M s E (ID a> } and 
M s E ' (ID a)} , 
If (n,q) are integers such that n/2 < q < n define 
e(n,q) = 2q - n - i, e'(n,q) = 2q - n. 
For any q i n - i, let s(n,q) be the greatest integer such that 
s(n,q) i n....::__l_ , For a general voting rule, a, let s(a) = s(n,q) where n - q 
q = min(IMI : Ma ID }. Let v(n,q) be the greatest integer which is a 
strictly less than ___g__ • n - q 
From Schofield (i9 84d) it is known that if dim(W) I.. s(a) then 
the a-core can be structurally stable. Thus we require that 
s(a) < w•(a) for an arbitrary voting rule. Moreover, for a q- rule, a, 
it can be shown that the Nakamura num ber v(a) satisfies 
v(a) = v(n,q) + 2 (Schofield, i9 83b). Since we shall show that 
w•(a) { e'(n,q) + i for a q- rule, we need to demonstrate that 
v(n,q) i s(n,q) 
this is the case. 
e'(n,q) + i. The following two lemmas show that 
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Lemma i 
If a is a q- rule then e(a) = e(n,q) and e'(a) = e'(n,q). If a 
is majority rule, with n odd, then e(a) = 0, e'(a) = i, whereas if n 
is even then e(a) = i, e'(a) = 2. 
Suppose that IMI = 2q - n - i, and Li c N\M. If
I Li I l n + i - q then IM U Li I l q and so M U Li a ID a' 
If ILil in - q, then IN\Lil l q and so M U  (N\M\Li> s ID a. 
Thus IMI l 2q - n - i �Ma E(ID). Clearly if IMI I.. 2q - n - 2, then 
there exists Li c N\M such that ILil = n + i - q yet IM U Lil = q - i 
so M U Li t ID a and IN\Li I = q - i so N\Li t ID a" Thus 
M e E(ID) � IMI l 2q - n - 1. Thus e(n,q) = 2q - n - 1. In 
identical fashion, when pk= o, let N' = N\(k} so IN1I = n' = n - i.
Then 
e'(n,q) = e(n',q) = 2q - n' - i = 2q - (n - i> - i 
= 2q - n. 
Finally if a is majority rule with n odd then 
e(a) = e(2k - i,k) = 2k - (2k - i) - i 0, and e'(a) = 1. 
If n is even then e(a) 
e'(a) = 2 
e(2k,k + i> = 2k + 2 - 2k - i i and 
Q. E. D, 
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Lemma 2 
For any q-rule, a (with n/2 < q < n} then 
1 { v(n,q} { s(n,q) < e'(n,q} + 1 = 2q - n + 1. If a is majority rule
then a(a} = 1 if n is odd and a(a} = 2 if n is even. 
By previous results (Schofield, 1983b) v(a} = 2 + v(n,q}, 
where v(n,q} is the greatest integer which is strictly leas than 
___g___ Thus q = v(n,q}(n - q} + r where O < r { (n - q}. Moreover, n - q' 
Since n 
To show 
(n,q} = 
s(n,q) ! n - 2 = 1 + ___g___ - _2_ n - q  n - q  n -q 
1 + v(n,q} r - 2 +-­n - q 
- q i 1, we obtain v(n,q} { a(n,q}. Clearly v(n,q} }. 1. 
that a(n,q) < 2q - n + 1, consider first of all the case 
(2k - 1,k} and k }. 2. Then s(n,q} .{� =2 _ _ 1_ k - 1 k - 1 
s(n,q) = 1. Moreover, e' (n,q) = 2. If (n,q) = (2k,k + 1) then 
a(n,q} = 
t1' _- 1
2 = 2. Moreover, e'(n,q} + 1 = 3. Finally, let 
q = n - 1. Clearly a(n,q} = n - 2 while e'(n,q} + 1 = n - 1. 
and 80 
Moreover, s(n,-) is a monotonically increasing but convex function of 
q, while e'(n,-) is a linear function of q. Thus a(n,q) < e' (n,q) + 1 
for all q s Cn/2,n - 1] . 
Q.E.D. 
S.  GENERIC NON-EXISTENCE OF OPTIMA 
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We turn now to the proof of Theorem 1 by a generalization of 
the Singularity Theorem. As before, when ID is a family of subsets of 
N let 
/\(W,ID,u} n /\ <w,M,u). 
Me ID 
We seek a bound for the dimension 
d(ID} dim[/\ (W,ID ,u)] . 
If we can show that d(ID) < 0 almost always (a.a.} then this will 
imply that /\ (W,ID ,u} =<I>. A lower bound on d(ID} is given by 
d(ID}}. k(ID} - 1 a.a. 
where k(ID} = l�CID} I and �(ID) is the collegium of ID. To see this 
observe that if {pi(x} : is �(ID)} are linearly dependent, then so is 
{pi(x} : is Ml for each Ms ID. Thus/\ (W,/((ID},u} c /\ (W,ID,u}. By 
ST(i), dim[/\ (W,/<(ID} ,u)] = k(ID} - 1 a.a. and so 
d(ID} =dim[/\ (W,ID ,u)] }. k(ID) - 1 a.a. The next theorem uses ST to 
obtain an upper bound on d(ID) when ID is a subset of the family of 
subsets 
{Mc N : IMI = r}. 
For ID c ID�, say ID aa tisfiea the intersection property iff for any 
ID' c ID it is the case that k(ID' ) { r - IID1I + 1. 
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Theorem 4 
Let W be a smooth manifold of dimension w, and let ID be a 
subfamily of ID
� which satisfies the intersection property. If w l r 
then it is almost always the case that 
dim[ /\ (W,ID ,u)] {.. r - IID I. 
We proceed by induction on the cardinality of subfamilies of 
ID· Let Hs be the induction hypothesis: for any subfamily ID ' of ID 
with IID 'I = s, then 
d(ID ') =dim[ /\ (W,ID ',u)] { r - s, a.a. 
H1 can be shown directly. Choose any M a ID , and let ID ' = {M} • Then 
I ID ' I = 1 and � (ID ' ) = M and so k (ID ' ) = IM I = r. By ST ( i) 
d(ID') { r - 1, a.a. 
Now we show H2• Let ID ' = {M1 •Mil. By the intersection property
k(ID ') IMl n Mi' .{ r - 1. By ST(ii)' 
d(ID ') { max{2(r - 1) - w, k(ID ') - 1} , a.a. 
But w .L r and so 2 ( r - 1) - w .{ r - 2 • Thus d (ID ' ) { r - 2, a. a. 
Assume Hs is true for some s with 2 { s < IID I. Consider
ID' c ID with IID'I = s. Choose Ma ID\ID', and let ID" = ID' U {M} , 
so IID "I = s + 1. By Hs, d(ID ') { r - s. By ST(ii). 
d (ID ") {.. max { d (ID ' ) + ( r - 1) - w, k (ID ") - 1} a. a. 
Again w l r and so
d(ID ') + (r - 1) - w {.. (r - s) + (r - w) - 1 £. r - (s + 1) a.a.
By the intersection property k(ID ") { r - IID "I + 1 and so 
k(ID") - 1 { r - (s + 1). Thus d(ID") £. r - (s + 1) a.a. Hence 
Hx � Hs+l' Consequently
d(ID) { q - IID I a.a. 
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Q, E.D. 
Note that if ID c ID r and there is a subfamily ID ' of ID , where ID ' 
satisfies the intersection property (even though ID might not) then 
immediately by Theorem 4 we see that 
d(ID) {.. d(ID ') £. r - IID •I. 
By a similar method to the proof of Theorem 4 it is possible to show 
that for any family of subsets of N, that if dim(W) ). n - 1 then 
d(ID) { k(ID) - 1 a.a. 
See Schofield (1980). These two results then give the following 
corollary. 
Corollary 1 
Let W be a smooth manifold of dimension w. 
(i) If w l r and r .{ n - 1 then 
where as before ID = {M c N : IMI 2. r}. r 
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(ii) If w 2. n - 1 then /\ (W,ID ,u) =ell a.a. for any non-collegial 
family ID of subsets of N. 
(i) Since r i n - 1 there exists some subset R of N with 
IRI = r + 1. Let 
{Mc R IMI = r}. 
Clearly I ID
� I = r + 1. Moreover ID r c ID r and so 
But ID� satisfies the intersection property, and so by 
Theorem 4, 
d(ID
�) S. r - (r + 1) < o a.a. 
Thus 
/\ (W,ID
;
,u) =cl> a. a. 
and hence 
(ii) Since ID is non-collegial k(ID) 0 and thus by Schofield 
(1980) 
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dim[ /\ (W, ID, u)] < O a.a. 
or 
/\ (W,ID ,u) =cl> a.a. 
Q.E.D. 
Corollary 1(!) essentially shows that Theorem 1 is valid with the 
instability dimension w•(a) bounded above by q for the case of a q-
rule. We now sharpen this result by showing that indeed w•(a) is 
bounded above by 2q - n + 1. For the voting rule, a, define the 
partition {IOr(a,W,N,u)}�=l of IO(a,W,N,u) by x s IOr(a,W,N,u) !ff
x s IO(a,W,N,u) and lfi s N : P1(x) OJI = r. Suppose now that
x s IOr(a,W,N,u) for r 2. 2. Then x s /\ (W,ID,u) where ID = {{i},{j) } 
for i f. j. By Corollary 1, if dim(W) l 1 then d(ID) < O a.a. and so
IOr(a,W,N,u) = ell a.a. Thus we see that
IO(a,W,N,u) I00(a,W,N,u) U I01(a,W,N,u) a.a.
Corollary 2 
Let a be a q-rule, and let W be a smooth manifold of dimension 
w, without boundary. If 2q - n + 1 i w i n - 2 then IO(a,W,N,u) is 
almost always empty. 
Since a is a q-rule, we assume n/2 < q S. n - 1, with n 2. 3. If
q n - 1 then 2q - n + 1 = n - 1, so we may assume q � n - 2. Let 
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r = 2q - n + 1, so that 2 {. r {. n - 3. Suppose that x s IO(a,W,N,u). 
By Corollary 1, 
x s I00(a,W,N,u) U I01(a,W,N,u) a.a.
There are two cases to consider: 
(i) x s I01(a,W,N,u). Suppose, without loss of generality, that
Pn(x) = o. Define ID� = {Mc: N\{n} : I M I  = r}. Since
r ! n - 3, there exists a coalition R c: N\{n} with 
,, ,, 
I R  I = r + 1. Let ID r CM c: R : I M I  = r}. Clearly ID r 
satisfies the intersection property and ID; c ID;. 
Moreover, I ID; I = r + 1. Just as in Corollary l(i) 
therefore 
/\ (W,ID�,u) c /\ (W,ID
;
,u) = d> a.a.
Hence it is almost always the case that at each point x s W 
there exists some subset V of N\{n}, with lvl = r, such that 
{pi(x) : i s V} are linearly independent. Now define
ID ={Mc V : I M I  = r - 1}. By Lemma 2, 
r - 1 = 2q - n = e(n,q), and so ID c: E'(IDa) where ID a is 
the family of a-decisive coalitions. By Theorem 3, for each 
M s ID there exist j (M) s (N\ {n}) \M such that 
{pi(x) : i s MU {j(M)}} are linearly dependent. Let 
M' =Mu {j(M)}, and define 
ID ' = {M' : M' = M U { j (M)} and M s ID } • Thus 
x s /\ (W, ID', u). Note first of all that I M' I = r for each 
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M' s ID' and that I ID  ' I  = r. Since the vectors 
i s V} are linearly independent it is evident that 
ID and thus ID ' satisfy the intersection property. By 
Theorem 4 
dim[/\ (W,ID ',u)] {. r - I ID  ' I  O, a.a. 
But x s I01(a,W,N,u) and so
x 8 /\ (W, {n} ,u) n /\cw. ID I ,u). 
By ST(ii) it is almost always the case that 
dim[/\ (W, {n} ,u) n /\ (W,ID ',u)] 
I. (1 - 1) + O - w < O since w l r l 2.
Hence I01(a,W,N,u) =�a.a. 
(ii) x s I00(a,W,N,u). Assume therefore that pi(x) F O, \Ii s N. 
Again without loss of generality assume that there exists a 
subset V c: N with lvl = r such that {pi(x) : i s VJ are 
linearly independent. Define 
ID {M c: V I M I  = r - 2} 
and proceed as in (i). Again by Theorem 3, ID c: E(ID a>, and
so for each M s ID there exists j (M) s N\V such that 
i s MU {j(M)}} are linearly dependent. Note that 
if r = 2 then this implies that pi(x) = O, for some i s N,
contradicting the assumption that x s I00(a,W,N,u). We may 
therefore assume that r l 3. Define
ID' {M' : M' =M U {j(M)) for Ms ID}. 
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Clearly x s /\ (W,ID ',u). But again both ID and ID' satisfy 
the intersection property, and hence by Theorem 4, 
dim[ /\ (W,ID ',u)] i r - (ID' I a.a. 
Since lvl = r, (ID' I = (ID I = C(r,r - 2) the number of 
combinations of (r - 2) objects from r objects. Moreover, 
r l 3 implies that (ID•( l r. This implies that 
/\ (W,ID ',u) = �a.a. Thus I00(a,W,N,u) = q> a.a. 
Corollary 3 
Let a be a q-rule. Let w(a) = 2q - n + 1. Then 
Int W n IO(a,W,N,u) = q> a.a. 
whenever W is a smooth manifold of dimension w l w(a), 
Q.E.D. 
Suppose first of all that the boundary of W is empty. If 
dim(W) l n - 1, then Corollary 1 applies, since a is non-collegial, to 
give IO(a,W,N,u) =<I> a.a. If 2q - n + 1 i dim(W) { n - 2, then 
Corollary 2 applies to give the same result. Hence 
dim(W) l 2q - n + 1 implies IO(a,W,N,u) =ct> a.a. If W has a non-empty 
boundary, then dim(W) l 2q - n + 1 implies IO(a,Int W,N,u/Int W) = q> 
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a.a. and so Int W n IO(a,W,N,u) = q> a.a. 
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Theorem 1 
By Corollary 3, we see that part (i) of Theorem 1 is valid 
wherever dim(W) l w(a). Define w•(a) to be the smallest integer with 
w•(a) { w(a) such that Theorem l(i) is valid. To see that w•(a) l 2 
proceed as follows. 
As we have noted, by Schofield (1984d), if dim W i s(n,q) then 
O(a,W) {u s U(W)N IO(a,W,N,u) F Cl>} 
has a non-empty interior in U(W)N. By Lemma 2, for any 
q s (n/2,n - 1), 
s(n,q) < 2q - n + 1. 
Thus w•(a) must satisfy 
s(n,q) < w•(a) { 2q - n + 1. 
In particular, s(n,q) l 1 and so w•(a) l 2. 
To prove part (ii), suppose that W is a smooth manifold 
without boundary. Then W = Int W, and the result follows by part(i). 
On the other hand if W is a smooth manifold with boundary then 
W = Int W U  aw, where aw, the boundary of W, is itself a smooth 
manifold of dimension dim(W) - 1 without boundary. Since 
dim(W) - 1 l w•(a) by assumption, then by part (i) 
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U1 = {u e U(W)
N : IO(a,aW,N,u/aW) = <I>} 
is residual, where u/aw is the smooth profile restricted to aw. Again 
by part (i) 
U2 = {u e U(W)
N : IO(a,Int W,N,u/Int W) = <I>} 
is residual where u/ Int W is the smooth profile restricted to Int W. 
But 
N U1 n u2 = {u s U(W)
IO(a,W,N,u) = <I>} 
is itself residual whenever dim(W) l w•(a) + 1. This proves the 
result. 
Q, E.D. 
It is as yet an open question whether w•(a) = w(a) or w•(a < w(a). 
This turns on whether or not a structurally stable core can exist in 
dimension 2q - n. 
6. GENERIC DENSENESS OF THE CYCLE SET
To prove Theorem 2 we make use of a procedure introduced in 
Schofield (1983a). 
Lemma 4 
Let a be a q-rule on a smooth manifold W, without boundary, of 
dimension w w(a) + 1. 
such that for any u s u1, 
N Then there exists a residual set u1 in U(W) 
W\IC(a,W,N,u) c U Sr(u) r 
where each Sr(u) is a subset of the singularity manifold associated
with at most w(a) + 1 individuals, and of dimension at most w(a). 
There exists a residual set A c U(W)N, such that for each
u e A, 
( i) for each i s N, /\ (W, {i}, u) is zero dimensional 
(ii) for each pair {i,j}, /\ (W,{i,j},u) is of dimension one. 
Since w(a) + 1 l 3, the set 
V(u) = W\U /\ (W, {i} ,u)\ U /\ (W, {i,j} ,u) 
i,j 
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is open dense in W. Moreover, if x. s V(u) and Pa(x) #<I>, then for any
v s pa(x) it is the case that pk(x) 'J..v, for ').. s JR , for at most one
ks N. Suppose therefore that x s V(u)\IC(a,W,N,u). By definition 
Pa(x) # <f>, Choose v s Pa(x). By definition, for all M s ID a' either 
O s PM(x) or v e pM(x). Introduce a new player, labelled (n + 1) with
Pn+l(x) = -v. Define a new voting rule a' whose decisive coalitions,
ID a', are given by M e ID a iff MU {n + 
l} s ID a'. Clearly if
M s E(ID a) then MU {n + 1} s E(ID a'). Moreover, v s Pa(x) iff
0 s pM(x) for all M e ID a', Thus v e Pa(x) iff Cp1 (x), • • •  ,pn+l (x)} is 
a a'-equilibrium. Just as in the proof of Corollary 2, define the 
family ID' of subsets of N U {n + 1} by M' s ID' iff M' = MU j(M) 
where I M I  = 2q - n + 1, j(M) d M and {pi(x) : i s M'} is a linearly
dependent set. Since x e V(u) it is the case that pi(x) 
i = 1,,,,,n + 1, From Theorem 3, it follows that 
x s /\ (W,ID',u). 
O for no 
The first possibility is that for some M' e ID' it is the case that 
(n + 1) t M', Since IM'I = 2q - n + 2, it is almost always the case 
that x must belong to a singularity set of dimension 
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e'(n,q) + 1 = w(a) which was to be proved. The second possibility is 
that for each M' e ID' it is the case that (n + 1) e M', 
Since we assume that q ! n - 1, then 2q - n + 2 ! n. Thus
, , , , 
there exist M1,M2 e ID' with M1 = {n + 1} U M1, Hi = {n + 1} U M2 and 
IM1 U M21 = 2q - n + 2. Thus 
v e Span({pi(x)
0 e Span({pi(x) i e M1 U Hill. Hence x e I\ (W,M1 U M2,u>. Since
IM1 U Mil = w(a) + 1, it is almost always the case that x belongs to a 
singularity manifold of dimension at most w(a), 
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Theorem 2 
(i) Let dim(W) L w(a) + 1. By Lemma 4, there is a residual set 
u1 s.t. if u e u1 and x e Int W\IC(a,W,N,u) then x belongs
to a singularity manifold Sr(u) of dimension at most w(a),
By Milnor (1958), Sr(u) is of measure zero, and moreover
Int W\Sr(u) is open dense in Int W. Since N is finite, 
there can only be a finite number of singularity manifolds. 
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Thus, it is almost always the case that IC(a,W,N,u) is open 
dense and can be partitioned into a finite number of path 
connected components. This proves Theorem 2(i). 
(ii) Assume dim(W) l w(a) + 2. It is almost always the case that 
IC(a,W,N,u) is open dense, by (i). But in this dimension 
range, an open subset of W cannot be separated by 
submanifolds of dimension w(a), Thus IC(a,W,N,u) almost 
always consists of a single open dense path connected 
component. 
Q.E.D. 
7 .  CONCLUSION 
The results presented here indicate how to compute w•(a) for 
an arbitrary non-collegial voting rule. Let ID a be the decisive
coalitions and E' (ID a> the family of pivotal subgroups. Let ID be any
subfamily of E' (ID a), and define
m(ID) = maxCIMI Ms ID}. 
Suppose that f:(ID) = <I> and that m(ID) + 1 ! IID I. Then precisely as in 
the proof of Corollary 2, it is the case that if dim{W) l m(ID) + 1 
then 
dim[ /\ (W,ID ',u)] � m(ID) + 1 - IID I ! o a.a. 
where ID' {MU {j(M)) : Me ID}, 
This can be used to show, just as in the proof of Corollary 2, that 
the optima set is empty a.a. Thus 
w•(a) {. min{m(ID )) + 1 
ID 
where ID can be any subfamily of E' (ID a> satisfying
(i) �(ID) =it and (ii) m(ID) + 1 { IID I. 
37 38 
REFERENCES 
Cohen, L., 1979, Cyclic sets in multidimensional voting models, 
Journal of Economic Theory 20, 1-12. 
Cohen, L. and s. A. Matthews, 1980, Constrained Plott equilibria, 
directional equilibria and global cycling sets, Review of 
Economic Studies 47, 975-986. 
Dasgupta, P., P. Hammond and E. Maskin, 1979, The implementation of 
social choice rules, Review of Economic Studies 46, 185-215. 
Ferejohn, J. A., D. M. Grether and R. D. McKelvey, 1982, 
Implementation of democratic social choice functions, Review of 
Economic Studies 49, 439-446. 
Golubitsky, M, and v. Guillemin, 1973, Stable mappings and their 
singularities (Springer Verlag, New York). 
Greenberg, J., 1979, Consistent majority rules over compact sets of 
alternatives, Econometrica 41, 285-297. 
Hirsch, M. W., 1976, Differential topology (Springer Verlag, New 
York). 
Maskin, E., 1977, Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality, forthcoming 
in: Mathematics of Operations Research. 
Maskin, E., 1979, Implementation and strong N ash equilibrium, in:. J. 
Laffont, ed., Aggregation and revelation of preference (North 
Holland, New York). 
Matthews, S. A., 1980, Pairwise symmetry conditions for voting 
equilibria, International Journal of Game Theory 9, 141-156, 
39 
Matthews, S. A., 1982, Local simple games in public choice mechanisms, 
International Economic Review, 23, 623-645. 
McKelvey, R. D,, 1976, Intransitivities in multidimensional voting 
models and some implications for agenda control, Journal of 
Economic Theory 12, 472-482, 
McKelvey, R. D., 1979, General conditions for global intransitivities 
in formal voting models, Econometrica 47, 1085-1111. 
Milnor, J,, 1958, Differential topology (Princeton University Lecture 
Notes, Princeton, New Jersey). 
Moulin, H., 1983, The strategy of social choice (North Holland, New 
York and Amsterdam). 
Nakamura, K., 1978, The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal 
preferences, International Journal of Game Theory 8, 55-61. 
Plott, C. R., 1967, A notion of equilibrium and its possibility under 
majority rule, American Economic Review 57, 787-806. 
Schofield, N., 1978, Instability of simple dynamic games, Review of 
Economic Studies 45, 515-594. 
40 
Schofield, N., 1980, Generic properties of simple Bergson-Samuelson 
welfare functions, Journal of Mathematical Economics 7, 175-192. 
Schofield, N., 1983a, Generic instability of majority rule, Review of 
Economic Studies 50, 695-705. 
Schofield, N., 1983b, Equilibria in simple dynamic games, in: P. 
Pattanaik and M. Salles, eds., Social choice and welfare (North 
Holland, New York and Amsterdam). 
Schofield, N., 1984a, Social choice and democracy, forthcoming 
(Springer-Verlag, New York). 
Schofield, N., 1984b, Social equilibrium and cycles on compact sets, 
Journal of Economic Theory 33, 59-71. 
Schofield, N., 1984c, Existence of equilibrium on a manifold, 
Mathematics of Operations Research 9, 545-551. 
Schofield, N., 1984d, Classification theorem for smooth social choice 
on a manifold, Social Choice and Welfare 1, 187-210. 
Smale, S., 1973, Global analysis and economics I: Pareto optimum and a 
generalization of Morse theory, in: M. Peixoto, ed., Dynamical 
systems (Academic Press, New York), 
41 
Strnad, J., 1984, The structure of continuous neutral monotonic social 
functions, forthcoming in: Social Choice and Welfare. 
Walker, M., 1977, On the existence of maximal elements, Journal of 
Economic Theory 16, 470-474. 
